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THE INTERPRETATION-CONSTRUCTION 
DISTINCTION* 
Lawrence B. Solum** 
INTRODUCTION 
The interpretation-construction distinction, which marks the 
difference between linguistic meaning and legal effect, is much 
discussed these days.1 I shall argue that the distinction is both 
real and fundamental—that it marks a deep difference in two 
different stages (or moments) in the way that legal and political 
actors process legal texts. My account of the distinction will not 
be precisely the same as some others, but I shall argue that it is 
the correct account and captures the essential insights of its 
rivals. This Essay aims to mark the distinction clearly.2 
The basic idea can be explained by distinguishing two 
different moments or stages that occur when an authoritative 
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 1. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods 
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 751 (2009); Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 5, 12–18 (2008); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge Of Change”: 
Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently 
Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 961–62 (2009); 
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 63 (2009); Reva B. 
Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1399, 1410–12 (2009). 
 2. This Essay is related to ideas developed in Semantic Originalism, which offers a 
general theory of constitutional interpretation. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic 
Originalism (Ill. Pub Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
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legal text (a constitution, statute, regulation, or rule) is applied 
or explicated. The first of these moments is interpretation—
which I shall stipulate is the process (or activity) that recognizes 
or discovers the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the 
legal text. The second moment is construction—which I shall 
stipulate is the process that gives a text legal effect (either my 
translating the linguistic meaning into legal doctrine or by 
applying or implementing the text). I shall then claim that the 
difference between interpretation and construction is real and 
fundamental. Although the terminology (the words “inter-
pretation” and “construction” that express the distinction) could 
vary, legal theorists cannot do without the distinction. 
One more preliminary point: the topic of this Essay is 
narrow and conceptual. This Essay has three goals: (1) to 
explicate the nature of the interpretation-construction 
distinction, (2) to argue that this distinction marks a real 
difference, and (3) to suggest that the distinction is helpful in 
that it enables legal theorists to clarify the nature of important 
debates, for example debates about constitutional interpretation. 
The Essay does not offer any particular theory of interpretation 
or construction—that it is, it remains agnostic about questions as 
to how linguistic meaning can be discerned or how legal content 
ought to be determined. Nor does this theory offer an account of 
the history and origins of the distinction. Those topics are 
important, but raising them in this Essay might shift attention 
away from prior questions about the nature and value of the 
distinction itself. 
Here is the roadmap. In Part II, this Essay shall discuss two 
preliminary sets of ideas: (1) vagueness and ambiguity, and (2) 
semantic content and legal content. In Part III, this Essay shall 
use these preliminary ideas to answer the questions, “What is 
interpretation?” and “What is construction?” In Part IV, this 
Essay shall consider some objections to the interpretation-
construction distinction. In Part V, this Essay shall develop the 
argument that the distinction is fundamental and indispensible. 
II. TWO PRELIMINARY SETS OF IDEAS 
Before we get to the distinction itself, we need to examine 
two related distinctions. The first of these is the distinction 
between vagueness and ambiguity; the second distinction is 
between semantic content and legal content. 
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A. VAGUENESS AND AMBIGUITY 
When we communicate via language (written or oral), we 
use words and phrases that can be formed into complex 
expressions using the rules of syntax and grammar. Sometimes 
the smallest meaningful unit of expression is a single word; 
sometimes, whole phrases carry meanings that cannot be 
decomposed into the meaning of constituent words. But 
whatever the relevant unit of meaning might be (words, phrases, 
sentences, or whole utterances), texts can be either vague or 
ambiguous. 
In ordinary speech, the distinction between vagueness and 
ambiguity is not always observed. The two terms are sometimes 
used interchangeably, and, when this is the case, they both mark 
a general lack of what we might call “determinacy” (or “clarity” 
or “certainty”) of meaning. But the terms “vague” and 
“ambiguous” also have technical (or more precise) meanings, 
such that there is a real difference in their meaning.3 
In the technical sense, ambiguity refers to the multiplicity of 
sense: a term is ambiguous if it has more than one sense.4 A 
classic example is the word “cool.” In one sense “cool” means 
low temperature, as in “the room was so cool we could see our 
breath.”5 In another sense, “cool” means something like hip or 
stylish,6 as in “Miles Davis was so cool that every young trumpet 
player imitated him.”7 And “cool” has several other senses—
 
 3. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition of 
“vague”: “Of words, language, etc.: Not precise or exact in meaning.” OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/ 
50274390?query_type=word&queryword=vague&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=
alpha&search_id=02Yl-2mHK6d-2502&result_place=1. And it offers the following 
definition of “ambiguous”: “Doubtful, questionable; indistinct, obscure, not clearly 
defined.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50006932?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=a
mbiguous&first=1&max_to_show=10. 
 4. Thus, the third definition in the Oxford English Dictionary is “Capability of 
being understood in two or more ways; double or dubious signification, ambiguousness.” 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50006931?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=a
mbiguity&first=1&max_to_show=10. 
 5. As in the following definition: “Of or at a relatively low temperature; 
moderately cold, esp. agreeably or refreshingly so (in contrast with heat or cold).” 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50049434?query_type=word&queryword=cool&first=
1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&search_id=02Yl-pvqbdQ-2524&result_place=1. 
 6. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary offers this definition: “Attractively 
shrewd or clever; sophisticated, stylish, classy; fashionable, up to date; sexually 
attractive.” Id. 
 7. The utterance in text is actually ambiguous as between the “hip” sense of cool 
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referring to temperament or self-control, to certain colors, and a 
lack of enthusiasm (or the presence of skepticism or mild 
hostility). 
The technical sense of vagueness refers to the existence of 
borderline cases: a term is vague if there are cases where the 
term might or might not apply.8 A classic example is the word 
“tall.” In one sense, “tall” refers to height (of a person or other 
entity) that is higher (in some way or to some degree) than 
average. Abraham Lincoln was tall: at almost 6’4” he was 
certainly tall for an adult male of his time. Napoleon was not tall, 
although at 5’6” he was of average height for his time. There are 
persons who are clearly tall and clearly not tall, but there are 
also borderline cases. For example, in the United States in the 
twenty-first century, males who are 5’11” or 5’10 ½” are neither 
clearly tall nor clearly not. Finally, a given word or phrase can be 
both vague and ambiguous. “Cool” is ambiguous, and, in the 
temperature sense, it is also vague. 
Getting ahead of ourselves for a moment, ambiguities in 
legal texts can (usually) be resolved by interpretation, but 
constitutional vagueness always requires construction. 
B. SEMANTIC CONTENT AND LEGAL CONTENT 
The second preliminary distinction that we need to make is 
between semantic content and legal content. Legal texts9 that are 
currently valid in an actual legal system that is currently in 
force10 have both kinds of content. The semantic content of a 
legal text is simply the linguistic meaning of the text. For 
example, the First Amendment freedom of speech has a 
 
and a more specific sense that refers to a style of jazz associated with Davis: “Of jazz 
music: restrained or relaxed in style (opposed to HOT adj. 12h). Also: performing or 
associated with music of this type.” Id. So the sentence in text might be asserting that 
Davis was very hip, or that his playing was relaxed in style. 
 8. See Roy Sorensen, Vagueness, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Aug. 29, 
2006) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness/ (“There is wide agreement that a term 
is vague to the extent that it has borderline cases.”); see also TIMOTHY ENDICOTT, 
VAGUENESS IN THE LAW (2000); ROSANNA KEEFE, THEORIES OF VAGUENESS (2000); 
TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS (1994); Roy Sorensen, Vagueness Has No Function 
in Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 387 (2001). 
 9. For the purpose of this paper, the phrase “legal text” is meant to be quite 
general and to refer, for example, to contracts, wills, trust instruments, patents, rules, 
regulations, statutes, constitutions, and opinions. 
 10. Of course, there can be legal texts that are no longer in force and legal systems 
that no longer exist. And there are proposed legal texts that were never enacted, and 
hypothetical legal texts that have never been proposed or enacted. In such cases, the 
obsolescent or unenacted legal texts have no currently operative legal content, although 
they still have semantic content. 
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linguistic meaning, associated with the meanings of the 
constituent words and phrases—“Congress,” “shall make,” “no,” 
“law,” “abridging,” “the freedom of speech,” and further 
specified by the conventions of syntax and grammar that allow 
these words and phrases to be combined into a meaningful 
whole. This same provision is the source of legal content that is 
not identical to its semantic content. As examples, consider the 
following doctrines that are connected to the First Amendment: 
(1) the prior restraint doctrine, (2) the rules that define the 
freedom of speech doctrine governing expression via billboards, 
and (3) the distinction between content-based regulations and 
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.11 These 
three rules are part of the legal content of free-speech doctrine, 
but these doctrines are not part of the linguistic meaning of the 
expression “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom 
of speech.”12 
Although I believe this point about the difference (between 
the linguistic meaning of the text and the legal effect that text is 
given by free speech doctrine) is obvious, it might be 
misunderstood. The point that I am making is that the text of the 
First Amendment says nothing about “billboards,” “prior 
restraint,” “content,” or “time, place, and manner.” These 
doctrinal ideas are not found in the linguistic meaning or 
semantic content of the text. The claim that the semantic content 
of the First Amendment does not contain this legal content does 
not (logically or conceptually) imply the further claim that the 
legal content of these doctrines cannot be derived from an 
appropriate theory of the purpose of the freedom of speech. 
Sometimes the word “meaning” is used to refer to the purpose 
of a legal text, but that sense of the word “meaning” is not the 
same as linguistic meaning. 
One characteristic of semantic content is especially 
important: the linguistic meaning of a text is a fact about the 
world. The meaning of written or oral communication is 
determined by a set of facts: these facts include the 
characteristics of the utterance itself—what marks appear in the 
writing?—and by facts about linguistic practice—how is that 
word used?—and—what are the ‘rules’ (or regularities) of syntax 
and grammar? The linguistic meaning of an utterance cannot be 
 
 11. For a brief overview of free-speech doctrine, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 921–1180 (2006). 
 12. It might be argued that these doctrines are a necessary implication of the 
linguistic meaning, but I shall set that possibility aside here. 
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settled by arguments of morality or political theory.13 For this 
reason, it would involve a category mistake to argue directly for 
a conclusion about the linguistic meaning of an utterance on the 
basis of a moral premise. 
Once again, we can jump ahead: interpretation yields 
semantic content, whereas construction determines legal content 
or legal effect. 
III. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 
We have now distinguished ambiguity from vagueness and 
semantic content from legal content; these two preliminary 
moves set the stage for articulating the distinction between 
interpretation and construction. 
A. WHAT IS INTERPRETATION? 
The interpretation-construction distinction reentered general 
legal theory in the context of debates over constitutional practice 
via the work of what are sometimes called the “New 
Originalists,” particularly Keith Whittington14 and Randy 
Barnett.15 As I discuss the distinction, I will use constitutional 
interpretation and construction in an illustrative context, but the 
distinction itself applies whenever an authoritative legal text is 
applied or explicated. 
In general, interpretation recognizes or discovers the 
linguistic meaning of an authoritative legal text. Contract 
interpretation yields the linguistic meaning of the contract. 
Patent interpretation yields the semantic content of the patent 
 
 13. Normative considerations may be relevant to linguistic meaning. For example, if 
faced with an ambiguous utterance, there may be contexts in which the normatively more 
attractive meaning is more likely the meaning intended by the speaker. But in cases like 
this, we do not reach the conclusion that the normatively attractive meaning is the true 
meaning because it is morally better. Rather, we infer than the author more likely 
intended the meaning because it was morally attractive. For example, if someone says “I 
would kill for some ice cream right now,” the utterance is ambiguous as between a literal 
meaning and a figurative meaning, in which the expression “I would kill” signifies an 
intense desire and not a prediction about taking the life of another human being. The 
moral wrongness of killing may be part of the reason for rejecting the morally 
unattractive literal interpretation, but the role of morality in cases like this is indirect. If 
we had reason to believe the literal meaning were the actual meaning (for example, if the 
person making the statement was a psychopath who had killed for ice cream in the past), 
then the moral wrongness of the literal interpretation might become irrelevant. 
 14. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); KEITH 
E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999). 
 15. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004). 
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claims. Statutory interpretation yields the linguistic meaning of 
statutory texts. 
Because my own work on the interpretation-construction 
distinction occurs mostly in constitutional theory, I will use the 
text of the United States Constitution as an illustrative example. 
In the constitutional context, interpretation is the activity that 
aims at discovery of the linguistic meaning of the various articles 
and amendments that form the United States Constitution. 
Constitutional interpretation yields the semantic content of the 
Constitution. Constitutional theorists may disagree about how 
this occurs. Original-Intentions Originalists may believe that the 
semantic content of the Constitution was fixed by the intentions 
of the Framers or ratifiers. Original-public-meaning Originalists 
may believe that the linguistic meaning of the Constitution is the 
meaning that the constitutional text had to the competent 
speakers of American English at the time the Constitution was 
framed and ratified. Some Living Constitutionalists may believe 
that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed by contemporary 
usage at the time interpretation occurs.16 In other words, there 
are various theories of constitutional interpretation—in the 
sense that the interpretation-construction distinction gives that 
phrase “constitutional interpretation”—but all of these theories 
aim at the recovery of the linguistic meaning of the 
constitutional text. 
In practice, interpretation responds to a variety of 
interpretative problem types—recurring situations in which we 
are in doubt about the linguistic meaning of the Constitution. 
For example, some constitutional language may be archaic—the 
meaning of the phrase “domestic violence” in the United States 
Constitution (referring to violence, e.g., rebellions or riots 
originating within the boundaries of a state) is not the same as 
the use of that phrase in contemporary writing to refer to 
violence within families, such as spousal abuse.17 In such cases, 
 
 16. My view, which is not at issue in this paper, has two parts: (1) the linguistic 
meaning of the Constitution was fixed by linguistic facts at the time each provision of the 
Constitution was framed and ratified, and (2) the relevant linguistic facts focus on the 
conventional semantic meanings of the relevant words and phrases and the patterns of 
usage that can be summarized as so-called “rules” of syntax and grammar. Conventional 
semantic meanings can be modified in four ways: (1) by the publicly available context of 
constitutional utterance, (2) by the division of linguistic labor which may create “terms of 
art,” (3) necessary implications of the semantic content of the text, and (4) constitutional 
stipulations (or units of meaning created by the Constitution itself). This view is 
developed and defended in depth in Solum, supra note 2. 
 17. For an illuminating discussion, see Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause 
in “New Originalist” Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129 (2009). 
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Originalists believe that the problem of ascertaining the 
linguistic meaning of the phrase can be resolved by resorting to 
linguistic facts: for example, original-public-meaning Originalists 
believe that the meaning of the phrase “natural born citizen” is 
determined by patterns of usage during the period when the 
Constitution of 1789 was drafted and ratified.18 
Another recurring problem of constitutional interpretation 
is ambiguity. It is possible that some of the words and phrases 
used in the Constitution are ambiguous (in the technical sense) 
because they have more than one linguistic meaning. A text or 
utterance that is ambiguous can frequently be disambiguated by 
consideration of the context. An acontextual instance of the 
word “cool” is ambiguous, but the sentence “the room was so 
cool that I had to put on my sweater” provides sufficient context 
to suggest that the relevant sense of “cool” is the temperature 
sense. Likewise, the phrase “natural born citizens” might be 
ambiguous as between “citizens whose birth was natural” and 
“persons who citizenship was ‘natural’ because it resulted from 
birth rather than artificial ‘naturalization’ by statute.” A resort 
to context might rule out the former meaning, and thus settle the 
semantic content of the Constitution as that given by the latter 
meaning. Characteristically, constitutional ambiguity can be 
resolved by interpretation that relies on the publicly available 
context of the constitutional provision at issue to select among 
the possible senses of the words and phrases of the text. 
I say that ambiguity characteristically can be resolved by 
interpretation, because it is not necessarily the case that all 
ambiguities can be resolved by reference to context. There may 
be cases where the available evidence about the context of an 
utterance is insufficient to resolve an ambiguity. Or there may be 
cases where an ambiguity in a legal text can be recognized as 
intentional based on the publicly-available context of the 
utterance, and there is no fact of that matter as to which of 
multiple senses was the true or correct sense of the utterance. If 
there are such cases of what we can call “irreducible ambiguity,” 
then interpretation cannot resolve them. 
 
 18. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22 (2008), available at http://www.michiganlawreview. 
org/assets/fi/107/ solum.pdf. 
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B. WHAT IS CONSTRUCTION? 
Conceptually, construction gives legal effect to the semantic 
content of a legal text. Construction can occur in a variety of 
contexts, and there are different modes of construction. One 
important distinction can be marked by differentiating the 
contexts in which construction can occur. For example, we can 
distinguish judicial construction from political construction and 
private construction. Courts engage in judicial construction when 
they translate the linguistic meaning of a legal text into doctrine: 
examples of judicial construction of the First Amendment were 
discussed above. Judicial construction also occurs when the 
effect to be given to semantic content of a legal text is 
constrained or modified by higher-order legal rules. For 
example, when a will violates the rule against perpetuities, a 
court may give the will a saving construction—this construction 
gives the will a legal effect that varies from the semantic content 
of the text. Yet another example of judicial construction occurs 
when a court simply translates the semantic content of the text 
into corresponding legal content, and then applies that content 
to a particular case—in such cases, the act of construction may 
go unnoticed since it does no work in determining legal 
content.19 
Courts are not the only entities that give effect to legal texts. 
Consider, for example, the familiar notion of the Constitution 
outside the courts. Various political institutions implement 
constitutional provisions that are rarely, if ever, the subject of 
judicial interpretation. The House and the Senate organized 
themselves in accord with the text of Article I of the United 
States Constitution, giving legal effect to the text without the aid 
of judicial constructions: we can call activities like this “political 
construction.” Likewise, private persons give legal effect to a 
variety of authoritative legal texts, including statutes, 
 
 19. One might say that when a legal text is neither ambiguous nor vague, then 
interpretation does all the work and no construction is required. There is nothing wrong 
with speaking in this way, but given the definitions of “interpretation” and 
“construction” that are stipulated in this Essay, construction is always a step in the 
process of understanding and applying a legal text. The stipulated definition of 
construction simply is that a legal practice is “construction” if it involves giving legal 
effect to an authoritative legal text. Legal texts that are neither vague nor ambiguous are 
given legal effect, and, hence, give rise to “construction” in the stipulated sense. Another 
way of putting this point is to observe that the semantic content of a legal text that is 
neither vague nor ambiguous is not the same thing as the legal content of the same text—
what we call “semantic content” is a different kind of thing than “legal content”—even 
when the two kinds of content map directly onto each other. Linguistic meaning is one 
kind of thing, but legal effect is a different kind of thing. 
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regulations, and contracts. We can call activities like this 
“private construction.” 
Although political construction and private construction are 
important, I want to focus on judicial construction of the 
Constitution for illustrative purposes. When courts engage in 
constitutional construction, they frequently translate the 
semantic content of the constitutional text (its linguistic 
meaning) into the legal content of constitutional doctrine (or 
rules of constitutional law). For example, construction of the 
First Amendment of the Constitution by the United States 
Supreme Court yielded a complex set of legal doctrines—
including the examples (doctrines concerning billboards, prior 
restraints, and “Time, Place, and Manner” restrictions) that were 
mentioned above. On the surface, it seems obvious that the 
content of constitutional doctrine is nonidentical with the 
semantic content of the constitutional text—although one can 
imagine an argument that the content of the doctrine is 
somehow a logical implication of the content of the text and 
obvious facts about the world. 
Because interpretation aims at the recovery of linguistic 
meaning, it is guided by linguistic facts—facts about patterns of 
usage. Thus, we might say that interpretation is “value neutral,” 
or only “thinly normative.” The correctness of an interpretation 
does not depend on our normative theories about what the law 
should be. But construction is not like interpretation in this 
regard—the production of legal rules cannot be “value neutral” 
because we cannot tell whether a construction is correct or 
incorrect without resort to legal norms. And legal norms, 
themselves, can only be justified by some kind of normative 
argument. 
For this reason, theories of construction are ultimately 
normative theories: because constructions go beyond linguistic 
meaning, the justification for a construction must include 
premises that go beyond linguistic facts. This point can be 
illustrated in the context of constitutional construction—
although similar points could be made about statutory 
construction, contract construction, and so forth. Some 
constitutional theorists may believe that constitutional 
constructions should be justified on the basis of legal norms, e.g., 
by the rules of stare decisis or on the basis of a legal principle 
that calls for deference to the political branches when the 
constitutional text does not require a contrary result. Other 
constitutional theorists may believe that explicitly nonlegal 
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normative considerations enter into constitutional construction. 
For example, Hart’s picture of the core and penumbra of legal 
rules implies that, in borderline cases, judges must exercise 
discretion, and such discretion could be exercised on the basis of 
a theory of political morality.20 
The claim that theories of constitutional construction must 
be normative does not imply that judges who engage in 
constitutional construction must resort to their own beliefs about 
morality or politics in particular cases.21 Consider, for example, a 
theory of constitutional construction that began with normative 
premises about the great value of the rule of law and the dangers 
of politicization of constitutional adjudication. Such a theory 
might argue that judges should adopt a principle of deference to 
the political branches in those cases where invalidation of 
legislative or executive action is not required by legal content 
that is required by the semantic content of the Constitution. A 
simpler articulation of that principle might be formulated in 
terms of H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between the core and 
penumbra: in the core, judges should follow the clear meaning of 
the constitutional text, but, in the penumbra, they should defer 
to the political branches.22 This theory of construction is justified 
 
 20. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (2d ed. 1994). 
 21. Thus, I believe that John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport are in error when 
they characterize “construction” as follows: 
In the abstract, constructionist originalism requires that judges follow the 
original meaning, but does not impose any legal requirements as to 
construction. Because there is no legally required or even accepted method for 
determining how to resolve questions of construction, judges are likely to 
determine how to engage in construction based on their own views. 
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 783. The question as to what legal standards 
govern “construction” is complex, and a complete treatment is outside the scope of this 
Essay, but two points can be made on this occasion. First, as “construction” is defined in 
this Essay, it is clear that there are a variety of conventional legal standards that govern 
construction. Construction is the activity of giving legal effect to an authoritative text: to 
say that activity is lawless is tantamount to claiming that the law is radically 
indeterminate, but that claim is implausible. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the 
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). Second, 
as a normative matter, those who embrace the interpretation-construction distinction can 
argue for theories of construction (e.g., for Originalist theories of constitutional 
construction) that do not allow judges to adopt constructions “based on their own 
[normative] views.” McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 783. For example, one 
might argue that constructions must be consistent with the purposes, functions, or goals 
that motivated adoption of the text, and that judicial construction should be bound by 
the doctrine of stare decisis. The point made in text is that theories of construction must 
be justified on normative grounds, e.g., by arguments from legal norms, or by arguments 
of political morality. When McGinnis and Rappaport argue against construction for 
normative reasons, they implicitly recognize this point. 
 22. See Hart, supra note 20, at 123. Whether such deference is always possible is 
questionable. For example, in cases that involve conflicts between the political branches, 
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on normative grounds—in this case by the value of the rule of 
law—but it does not authorize judges to use their own beliefs 
about morality or politics to shape constitutional doctrine in 
particular cases. This principle of construction would bear strong 
resemblance to Thayer’s position.23 
Construction becomes obvious—it grabs our attention—in 
cases in which the linguistic meaning of a legal text is vague. 
Once we have determined that the semantic content of the text 
is vague and that the case to be decided lies in the penumbra of 
the rule, interpretation cannot resolve the case.24 Interpretation 
discerns linguistic meaning, but when a text is vague, then the 
output of interpretation (the semantic content of the text) is 
vague. In such cases, we might say that interpretation makes its 
exit and construction enters the scene. In cases where the text is 
vague and the resolution of the particular dispute requires the 
 
the courts might be required to adopt a construction that favors the executive over the 
legislative branch, or vice versa. 
 23. JAMES B. THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1893). 
 24. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport seem to believe that interpretation can 
resolve vagueness. They argue as follows: 
Vagueness might be limited to situations where it is equally likely whether or 
not a term extends to a proposed application. By contrast, vagueness might be 
defined to encompass situations in which there are plausible arguments that a 
term both extends and does not extend to an application, even though the 
evidence for one of the positions is stronger. As with the definition of 
ambiguity, the equally likely definition seems unlikely to occur often and the 
plausible definition seems weak, since it might not be regarded as real 
vagueness. 
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 774. Their argument raises questions about the 
nature of vagueness that cannot be explored in depth on this occasion. The account of 
vagueness that I offered differentiates vagueness from ambiguity in precisely the respect 
in which McGinnis and Rappaport believe that vagueness and ambiguity are alike. I 
believe that the meaning of “vagueness” requires that vague words or phrases have 
borderline cases, where the word or phrase neither clearly applies nor clearly does not 
apply. McGinnis and Rappaport believe that vague expressions can always have a 
linguistic meaning that draws a bright line and, hence, provides (in theory) a bright line. 
On this occasion, I would simply observe that this account of vagueness will face 
difficulties in accounting for a variety of well-known linguistic phenomena. For example, 
if I were to say “please do not invite any tall men to my birthday party,” the McGinnis 
and Rappaport account demands that the linguistic meaning of that utterance somehow 
contain a bright line, i.e., 6’0”, such that every man is either tall or not tall. But this 
simply does not seem to track the way vague words and phrases work in actual natural 
languages. As the word “tall” is ordinarily used in English, its linguistic meaning simply 
does not include a bright line, and interpreting my hypothetical utterance as containing 
such a bright line would misconstrue its actual meaning. 
Of course, there may be some words and phrases that are ambiguous as between 
vague and nonvague senses. For example, it is possible that, in some contexts of 
utterance, the word “tall” refers to a technical meaning that does draw a bright line. But 
the possibility that seeming vagueness can be resolved in this way does not entail the 
necessity that it can always be so resolved. 
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court to draw a line, the dispute-resolving work is being done by 
construction. Construction comes to the fore, and the prior work 
done by interpretation recedes into the background. 
Constitutional construction might also become noticeable in 
a variety of other contexts. For example, it is at least 
theoretically possible that a legal text could contain gaps or 
contradictions. If two provisions of a given text (e.g., a contract, 
statute, or constitution) have semantic content such that the 
corresponding legal rules would contradict each other, then 
construction might resolve the contradiction—perhaps on the 
basis of an argument from the overall structure of the text, or 
from the purposes that could be attributed to the relevant 
provisions. Likewise, if there were a constitutional issue on 
which the text was silent, then a construction might fill the gap. 
Similarly, it is theoretically possible that there are some 
ambiguities that cannot be resolved by interpretation. For 
example, it could be the case that the available evidence about 
linguistic usage and context is simply not sufficient to reveal the 
public meaning of the provision.25 Or it might be the case that a 
text was deliberately written in ambiguous language, perhaps 
because the drafters could not agree on some point and decided 
to paper over their disagreement with ambiguous language that 
would kick the can down the road for resolution by subsequent 
construction. If there were such irreducible ambiguities, then 
their resolution would require construction. 
So far, I have been discussing the situations in which 
construction is obvious or noticeable. But construction also 
occurs in situations where it is overlooked or invisible,because 
interpretation has already done the work. Theoretically, this 
occurs when doctrine mirrors the semantic content of the text. 
For example, the Constitution provides: “The Senate of the 
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 
state.” Our constitutional practice on this question is settled—
the rule of constitutional law corresponds exactly to the 
 
 25. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport characterized construction 
differently—stating that it is the view of constructionists (including the author this Essay) 
that construction occurs whenever the text is either vague or ambiguous: 
“Constructionists—theorists who adhere to the distinction between interpretation and 
construction—believe that interpretation governs situations when the original meaning 
of a constitutional provision is clear, whereas construction governs situations when the 
original meaning is ambiguous or vague.” McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 772. 
My view is that ambiguities can usually be resolved by interpretation (on the basis of the 
context of utterance), although it is at least theoretically possible that some ambiguities 
cannot be so resolved. 
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linguistic meaning of the written Constitution.26 In other words, 
this is a case where the legal content of constitutional doctrine is 
equivalent to the semantic content of the text. 
In other cases, the semantic content of the text constrains 
but does not fully specify the legal content of constitutional 
doctrine. Once again, Hart’s picture of core and penumbra is 
helpful: the semantic content determines the core of constitu-
tional doctrine, but other factors determine the shape of 
doctrines in the penumbra. In both cases, construction is at 
work, but construction in the core seems as if it is more or less 
automatic (or even seemingly “mechanical”27) and, hence, 
opaque or invisible. Construction in the penumbra requires 
resort to some theory or principle that is outside the 
constitutional text. Hence, construction in the penumbra 
involves judgment or choice and is obvious or noticeable. 
We can call the zone of underdeterminacy in which 
construction (that goes beyond direct translation of semantic 
content into legal content) is required for application “the 
construction zone.” The size of the construction zone will vary 
from text to text. Some legal texts are drafted in language that 
supplies bright line rules; other texts use general, abstract, and 
vague language that frequently requires construction that goes 
beyond mere translation of semantic content into legal content. 
For example, the United States Constitution contains provisions 
of both sorts. The provision that specifies that each State shall 
have two senators can be translated directly into practice: state 
legislators provide for election of two senators, not less and not 
more. But other provisions of the constitution may require 
extensive work in the construction zone: “due process of law,” 
“the executive power of the United States,” and “freedom of 
speech” are framed in abstract, general, and vague language. 
 
 26. There may be possible cases where even the two-senators-per-state rule could 
not be translated directly into a corresponding rule of constitutional law. For example, if 
some science-fiction catastrophe resulted in a state with only one citizen, it is possible 
that the two-senators-per-state-rule would be modified. The existence of such 
possibilities is perfectly consistent with the idea that the legal content of constitutional 
doctrine mirrors the semantic content of the text in situations that actually arose and 
seem likely to arise in the future. 
 27. The notion that law cannot be mechanical is widely accepted following Roscoe 
Pound’s famous article. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 
605 (1908). My claim in text is that construction can seem mechanical because the legally 
correct construction will seem obvious to competent legal practitioners. Whether 
construction can actually be mechanical is a different question, the answer to which 
would depend on what is meant by “mechanical” in this context. 
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IV. OBJECTIONS 
These remarks do not provide the occasion for a systematic 
justification or defense of the interpretation-construction 
distinction. Nonetheless, I shall say a few words about some of 
the objections that might be posed. 
A. THE PERSUASIVE DEFINITION OBJECTION 
One possible objection would focus on the idea that the 
interpretation-construction distinction involves a fallacy of 
persuasive definition. Originalists use the distinction to mark the 
difference between the Originalist enterprise of determining the 
linguistic meaning of the Constitution—constitutional 
interpretation—and the nonoriginalist enterprise of specifying 
the content of constitutional doctrine where the Constitution is 
vague (or otherwise underdeterminate)—constructional 
construction. (??? Error) It might seem that the point of the 
distinction is to argue that constitutional interpretation must be 
Originalist by definitional fiat.28 
 
 28. Andrew Coan made this argument. See Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of 
Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 1025, 1077–83 (2010). 
Here is the core of his statement of the argument: 
The first is the claim that interpretation simply is the search for original 
meaning. As we have seen already, it is difficult to make sense of this claim as a 
matter of descriptive analysis. It is easy, however, to make sense of it as an 
instance of persuasive definition. In fact, it tracks the three core features of 
persuasive definition perfectly. 
First, interpretation is a vague term that is commonly applied to a wide variety 
of quite different activities. It certainly can and often does refer to the search 
for a document’s original meaning, as originalists would have it. But, as 
discussed earlier, it is also commonly used to describe a wide range of practices 
that have little or nothing to do with the search for original meaning. What 
these varied activities have in common, if anything, is unclear but not 
particularly important for present purposes. The important point is that the 
term interpretation is used flexibly and expansively with no clear line 
distinguishing its literal and metaphorical uses. For this reason, it is relatively 
easy for a narrow definition of interpretation, emphasizing one easily 
recognizable subset of interpretive practice, to pass as merely clarificatory or 
descriptive--perhaps even to its proponents. Where the precise bounds of a term 
are unclear, it is more difficult to detect when they have been moved or crossed. 
Second, interpretation has strong positive associations in the context of 
constitutional decisionmaking, especially constitutional decisionmaking by 
judges. Indeed the idea that judges should interpret, rather than make or 
change, the Constitution is so closely and instinctively associated with core 
values of our legal system as to be practically axiomatic. This makes the term 
“interpretation” a valuable prize indeed in normative constitutional discourse. 
If originalists can appropriate it for themselves, they will have succeeded in 
placing their theoretical opponents in a very tight rhetorical spot. Who, in the 
contemporary American legal culture, wants to argue that judges in 
constitutional cases should do something other than interpret the Constitution? 
Perhaps a few contrarian (or tone-deaf) academics, but certainly no one else. 
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That argument is mistaken. From the point of view of legal 
theory, the terminology is arbitrary. For example, we could 
redescribe the distinction using alternative terminology: we 
might distinguish between “constructive interpretation” and 
“linguistic interpretation” or between “interpretation in the 
semantic sense” and “interpretation in the applicative sense.” 
The important point is that there is a real difference between the 
activity that this Essay calls “interpretation,” and the activity 
that this Essay calls “construction.” That is, there is a real 
difference between linguistic meaning and legal effect, and 
between semantic content and legal content. That real difference 
would remain if the vocabulary were changed. 
One more point here. Originalists did not invent the 
interpretation-construction distinction. It has a long pedigree in 
legal usage—the distinction appears in contract law, the law of 
trusts and wills, patent law, and in constitutional law, as well. 
The distinction can be traced back at least as far as Franz 
Lieber’s 1839 text, Legal and Political Hermeneutics.29 And 
distinguished scholars in a variety of doctrinal fields discussed 
it.30 For the distinction to be an example of the persuasive 
definition fallacy, in the sense specified by C.L. Stevenson,31 
there must have been an attempt to covertly substitute a 
stipulated definition for ordinary usage, but that has not 
happened in the case of this distinction. The distinction arose 
before contemporary debates about Originalism in constitutional 
theory and plain meaning in statutory interpretation. The point 
of the interpretation-construction distinction is to clarify 
debates, not to assume their conclusions. 
 
Id. at 1081–82. I believe that Coan’s argument is both uncharitable and flatly mistaken as 
applied to the major originalist theorists who embraced the interpretation-construction 
distinction. Whatever the merits of the argument as addressed to others, it is clear that it 
has no force as applied to the explication of the interpretation-construction distinction in 
this essay.  
 29. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 55–82 (Roy M. 
Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1970) (1839), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=_wwAAAAAYAAJ&dq=lieber+interpretation+cons
truction&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
 30. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981); 3 ARTHUR L. 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 534, at 7–15 (1960); 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.7, at 255–56 (2d ed. 1998); Edwin W. Patterson, The 
Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964); Keith A. 
Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the “Four Corners” to Parol 
Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MISS. L.J. 73 (1999); Richard F. Storrow, 
Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction Between Will Interpretation and 
Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65 (2005);. 
 31. C.L. Stevenson, Persuasive Definitions, 47 MIND 331 (1938). 
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B. THE REDUCTION OF LINGUISTIC MEANING TO LEGAL 
EFFECT 
A second response to the interpretation-construction 
distinction might claim that the semantic meaning of legal texts, 
in general (and the Constitution, in particular), simply is the 
legal meaning of the associated doctrines. In other words, it 
might be argued that linguistic meaning (semantic content) can 
be reduced to legal effect (legal content). Although one can 
imagine heroic efforts to redeem this claim, it is surely 
implausible on its face. For example, we can talk about a 
divergence between the rules of constitutional law and the 
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text, but such talk would 
be mistaken and even absurd if it were a conceptual truth that 
the legal content simply is the semantic content.32 Similarly, we 
can investigate the linguistic meaning of a legal text that is no 
longer in force, or that was never enacted, but if the claim that 
semantic and legal content are identical were true, such 
investigations would be senseless33—the equivalent of an attempt 
to investigate the nature of phlogiston.34 
This point is an important one, and it can be illustrated 
clearly by a familiar example. Take the case of a will that may 
violate the rule against perpetuities. When a lawyer or judge is 
analyzing the will, the first step is interpretation: what is the 
linguistic meaning of the text? If the will does (as a matter of 
linguistic fact) contain a provision that would create perpetuity, 
the next step requires construction—determining the legal effect 
of the will. In some cases, the will may be given a saving 
construction (or reformation).35 The second step is construction: 
what legal effect shall be given to the will? In answer to this 
question, the court can substitute a provision that matches the 
semantic content of the will as closely as possible without 
 
 32. Notice that the assertion that the semantic content is identical to the legal 
content is not the same as the assertion that the semantic content determines (or even 
wholly determines) legal content. There may be cases in which the semantic content of a 
legal text wholly determines the legal content of the legal doctrine associated with the 
text (and, hence, the legal effects of the text), but, in such cases, the linguistic meaning 
and the legal effect are two distinct entities. 
 33. If the semantic content of an inoperative legal text were equivalent to the legal 
effect or legal content, then the inoperative text would have no meaning (since, by 
definition, inoperative legal texts have no legal effect). This would lead to some very odd 
consequences. For example, proposed legislation is not legally operative and, therefore, 
would have no linguistic meaning.  
 34. CHARLES SINGER, A SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS TO 1900, at 281 
(1959). 
 35. See Hochberg v. Proctor, 805 N.E.2d 979, 984 (2004). 
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violating the rule against perpetuities. The claim that the 
linguistic meaning of a legal text just is its legal meaning requires 
that we see cases like this in a very odd and counterintuitive way. 
If the linguistic meaning of the will were the legal meaning, then 
there would be no perpetuities problem and no need for a saving 
construction. But our understanding of cases like this is that the 
linguistic meaning of the text did create a perpetuities problem, 
and that the saving construction was not part of that linguistic 
meaning, but was, instead, something that the court did to the 
will. The theory that semantic content and legal content are 
identical does not save the appearances, because it suggests that 
ordinary ways of talking about legal texts are radically mistaken. 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport proposed an 
ingenuous version of the reduction argument. They argue that 
the linguistic meaning of the Constitution is determined by both 
general linguistic facts (conventional semantic meanings and 
regularities of syntax and grammar) and by legal facts (the 
canons of interpretation and construction that exist at the time a 
given provision is framed and ratified). Here is their statement 
of the argument: 
Originalists argue that the Constitution’s meaning is fixed as 
of the time of enactment. Originalists—both of the original 
intent and original meaning variety—argue that modern 
interpreters should be guided by the word meanings and rules 
of grammar that existed when the Constitution was enacted. 
 But word meanings and grammatical rules do not exhaust the 
historical material relevant to constitutional interpretation. 
There are also interpretive rules, defined as rules that provide 
guidance on how to interpret the language in a document. It is 
our position that Originalism requires modern interpreters to 
follow the original interpretive rules used by the enactors of 
the Constitution as much as the original word meanings or 
rules of grammar.36 
This version of the argument does not commit the logical 
mistake of conflating semantic content and legal content. 
Instead, it argues that legal rules of interpretation and 
construction are, themselves, a special kind of linguistic fact that 
operates causally to create a perfect correspondence between 
linguistic meanings and legal effects. 
A full answer to this objection is outside the scope of this 
Essay, but, given the importance of the point to the viability of 
 
 36. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 756. 
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the interpretation-construction distinction, a brief discussion is 
appropriate. 
The relationship between the canons of interpretation and 
construction that are applied to legal texts and the legal meaning 
of those texts is complex. My discussion of that relationship 
begins by applying the interpretation-construction distinction to 
the canons themselves. This enables us to see that canons (or 
rules, or principles) of construction can actually be sorted into 
two kinds—canons of interpretation and canons of construction. 
Canons of interpretation are rules of thumb—they point 
judges and other legal actors to facts about the way language 
works and to reliable procedures for making inferences about 
linguistic meaning. For example, as a rule of thumb, when we are 
faced with two possible readings of a text, and one reading 
makes part of the text superfluous, we can infer that the reading 
that would result in each and every provision adding meaning is 
more likely to be the correct reading.37 But this is only a rule of 
thumb that summarize a general linguistic regularity (intuitively 
grasped by competent users of the language).38 There could be 
evidence that suggests that the redundancy was intentional—for 
emphasis, or to guard against misinterpretation. 
Canons of construction operate differently. A canon of 
construction guides the process by which linguistic meaning is 
translated into legal effect. The so-called “substantive” canons 
are clear examples of canons of construction. For example, the 
avoidance canon tells judges to construe statutory language so as 
to avoid constitutional issues.39 The point of this canon is not 
linguistic accuracy. Rather, the avoidance canon makes a 
difference precisely in those cases in which the ordinary 
linguistic meaning of a statute would create a constitutional 
issue. 
Consider now the relationship between the two different 
kinds of canons and the argument that methods of interpretation 
are analogous to rules of grammar and syntax. It is clear that 
 
 37. See Wash. Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879) (“It is a cardinal rule of 
statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every 
word.”); Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cnty., 829 P.2d 746, 751–52 (1992) (“Statutes 
should not be interpreted in such a manner as to render any portion meaningless, 
superfluous or questionable.”). 
 38. Cf. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 245 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (observing that some canons of interpretation “simply crystallize what 
English speakers already know”). 
 39. See generally William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-
Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001). 
!!!SOLUM-271-INTERPRETATION-CONSTRUCTIONDISTINCTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010  10:48 AM 
114 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:95 
 
canons of interpretation are not constitutive of meaning—they 
are mere rules of thumb. But the linguistic regularities that we 
call “rules” of syntax and grammar are constitutive: these 
linguistic regularities enable individual words and phrases to 
combine in complex ways. It would be a conceptual mistake to 
conflate the distinction between these two different roles. 
What about canons of construction? Do they function in a 
way that is relevantly similar to the rules of grammar and syntax 
in the production of the linguistic meaning of legal texts? Once 
we attend to the actual way these canons function, it becomes 
apparent that they do not. The substantive canons, such as the 
avoidance canon, are parasitic on the interpretation-construction 
distinction. They assume that linguistic meaning is distinction 
from legal effect: they operate as general rules or principles that 
operate on semantic content to produce legal content. Thus, the 
existence of canons of construction actually is evidence that 
counts in favor of the existence of the interpretation-
construction distinction. 
For this reason, McGinnis and Rappaport’s argument does 
not establish that linguistic meaning reduces to legal meaning (as 
determined by original methods), or that semantic content is 
identical to legal content (again, as determined by original 
methods). But the fact that their argument does not establish 
reduction in general does not imply that legal conventions 
governing interpretation never operate to determine linguistic 
meaning. One can easily imagine examples where the linguistic 
meaning of an utterance would be, in part, determined by a 
specialized legal convention that might be called a canon of 
interpretation or construction. Such examples are most plausible 
in cases where the authoritative legal text is addressed to a 
specialized audience of legal practitioners (e.g., the more 
technical provisions of the Internal Revenue Code). But the fact 
that legal conventions sometimes can determine linguistic 
meaning does not imply that they always must play this role. 
C. THE IRRELEVANCE OF SEMANTIC CONTENT OBJECTION 
A third response to the interpretation-construction 
distinction might employ the method of confession and 
avoidance: yes, there is a distinction between the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional text and constitutional doctrine, 
but the linguistic meaning is simply irrelevant, as far as the law is 
concerned. Once again, we can imagine heroic efforts to make 
good on this claim. For example, it might be argued that the 
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linguistic meaning of the text is radically indeterminate: if this 
were the case, then all the work of shaping constitutional 
doctrine would be done by construction. It is far from clear that 
claims of the radical indeterminacy of language are even 
plausible, much less correct.40 
A more modest version of the irrelevance criticism might 
claim that, even when the language of legal texts is neither vague 
nor ambiguous, legal doctrine may depart from the language. 
There are situations in which this seems to be the case. The First 
Amendment says “Congress shall make no law,” but this 
provision applies to executive and judicial action. Much needs to 
be said about such cases, but, on this occasion, I will offer only 
one observation. Neither the existence of such examples in some 
cases, nor the theoretical possibility that all provisions might be 
construed to create doctrines that are inconsistent with the text, 
implies the irrelevance of the interpretation-construction 
distinction. It seems obvious that the linguistic meaning of the 
text is (at the very least) an important consideration in the 
development of constitutional doctrine. So long as the semantic 
content of legal texts contributes (in some nontrivial way) to 
legal content, thereby making a difference to the legal effect of 
the texts, the distinction between interpretation and construction 
is at least relevant to legal practice. 
V. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF THE INTERPRETATION-
CONSTRUCTION DISTINCTION 
Although the main point of this short Essay is simply to 
explicate the interpretation-construction distinction, I also want 
to say a few words about the distinction’s importance or value. 
In particular, I want to advance the strong claim that the 
distinction is indispensible—that legal theory cannot do without 
this claim. Of course, when I say “indispensible,” I mean to use 
that term in its normative sense: if we try to do legal theory 
without the distinction between semantic content and legal 
content, our theories will be defective—they will not capture the 
real structure of the processes by which authoritative legal texts 
are explicated and applied. One more caveat: although the 
distinction between “interpretation” and “construction” is 
indispensible, those particular words are being used in a 
 
 40. Solum, supra note 21 (discussing the claim that law is radically indeterminate). 
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technical sense. A different vocabulary could be used to describe 
the distinction. 
Why do I believe that the interpretation-construction 
distinction is something that legal theorists must acknowledge? 
Another way of framing the question might be this: what is the 
payoff of the interpretation-construction distinction? The answer 
to this question focuses on conceptual clarity: without the 
interpretation-construction distinction, our thinking about law 
will necessarily be confused. To see why this is the case, we can 
return to constitutional theory—and the debate between 
Originalists and Living Constitutionalists.41 
Originalists assert that the meaning of the Constitution is 
the original public meaning of the text: in the case of the 
Constitution of 1789, that means that the meaning of the text is a 
function of the conventional semantic meaning of the words, 
phrases, and patterns of usage (rules of syntax and grammar) 
that prevailed at the time these provisions of the Constitution 
were framed and ratified. Living constitutionalists understand 
themselves to be disagreeing with Originalists. They argue that 
the meaning of the Constitution must and should adapt to 
changing circumstances and values. As we all know, this debate 
has been going on for quite some time, and it seems to have 
resulted in what we might call “dialectical impasse”—with each 
side absolutely certain that the other side is making a huge 
mistake (perhaps the product of stupidity, ingenuousness, or bad 
faith). 
But once we have the interpretation-construction distinction 
at hand, it turns out that some of the apparent disagreement 
between Originalism and Living Constitutionalism dissolves, and 
that the remainder is reconfigured. The core of Originalism is a 
theory of constitutional interpretation: Originalists claim that the 
linguistic meaning of the constitution is fixed by linguistic facts at 
the time that each constitutional provision is framed and ratified. 
Most Originalists also affirm a partial theory of constitutional 
construction: they claim that the legal content of constitutional 
doctrine should be constrained by the linguistic content of the 
text. To simplify for purposes of exposition, Originalists believe 
that the legal content of constitutional doctrine must be 
consistent with the semantic content of the constitutional text—
 
 41. This discussion adapts remarks in Semantic Originalism. See Solum, supra note 
2. 
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although there may be special circumstances in which 
inconsistencies are allowed. 
Living constitutionalism, on the other hand, is primarily a 
theory of constitutional construction. Living constitutionalists 
believe that the legal content of constitutional doctrine must 
change with changing circumstances and values. Although there 
may be Living Constitutionalists who believe that that the 
commitment to change in constitutional doctrine requires them 
to deny that the linguistic content of the Constitution is fixed, 
that belief is obviously false. Even if the linguistic meaning of the 
Constitution is fixed (as originalists recognize), the content of 
constitutional doctrine can grow and change over time (as it 
obviously does). One reason for this phenomenon is the fact of 
constitutional underdeterminacy: many constitutional provisions 
are general, abstract, and vague. “Legislative power” and 
“freedom of speech” are examples. When a legal provision is 
vague, then semantic content underdetermines legal content. 
Thus, a variety of specific rules regarding prior restraints could 
be consistent with the linguistic meaning of the First 
Amendment, and these specific rules could change over time. 
Once the interpretation-construction distinction is 
recognized, it becomes apparent that some (and perhaps even 
many) aspects of the debate between Originalists and Living 
Constitutionalists are the product of conceptual confusion. In 
fact, some forms of living constitutionalism may actually be 
compatible with some forms of originalism. If Living 
Constitutionalists are willing to live within what we can call “the 
construction zone”—the zone of indeterminacy created by the 
general, abstract, and vague provisions of the Constitution—they 
can embrace the notion that the linguistic meaning of the 
constitutional text was fixed at the time of framing and 
ratification. If Originalists are willing to accept that 
constitutional doctrine should and must change over time within 
the limits imposed by the original meaning of the text, then they 
can accept a constrained version of Living Constitutionalism. 
I said that some forms of living constitutionalism might be 
consistent with some forms of originalism. Other forms of these 
two theories may be inconsistent. For example, if some Living 
Constitutionalists believe that the linguistic meaning of the text 
does not, in any way, constrain the content of legal doctrine, 
then those Living Constitutionalists wholly reject originalism. 
Likewise, if some Originalists believe (in my opinion, 
mistakenly) that there are no vague provisions in the 
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Constitution, then those Originalists might wholly reject living 
constitutionalism. 
For our purposes, the point is that the true shape of the 
debate between Originalists and Living Constitutionalists only 
comes into view when we acknowledge the interpretation-
construction distinction and the related distinctions between 
vagueness and ambiguity, and between semantic content and 
legal content. A similar point might be made about 
contemporary debates about statutory interpretation and 
construction. Advocates of “plain meaning” are concerned with 
interpretation—with the notion that the linguistic meaning of a 
statute should constrain the range of acceptable constructions. 
Advocates of “purposivism” or “dynamic interpretation” are 
focused on construction: their position could be reformulated as 
the claim that the construction of statutes should be guided by 
purposes, and the further notion that some normative justified 
constructions may override the linguistic meaning of the 
statutory text, in some range of circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
I hope to have accomplished two tasks. The first and most 
important of these is simply to explicate the interpretation-
construction distinction—to say what that distinction is. The 
second task is to give a sense of the importance of the 
distinction—to say something about the role it must and should 
play in legal theory. Of course, this leaves many important 
questions of legal practice unanswered. In particular, I did not 
tackle the question, “when should construction override the 
linguistic meaning of an authoritative legal text?” But I hope 
that I demonstrated that the question is clearer and more 
perspicuous if it is asked in that way. 
